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The attached document below contains CDC Guidelines for State Health Departments:
1. Responding to "Anthrax Threats" and Anthrax (B. anthracis) Diagnostic Testing
2. Anthrax Information for Laboratory Personnel
You will receive this file in Word, WordPerfect, and PDF file formats, in three separate emails because your email server has bounced 
email files larger than 2 megs. To assure receiving timely CDC Health Advisories, you might want to discuss with your email administrator 
the ability to receive larger files.
CDC Guidelines for State Health Departments
I. Responding to Anthrax Threats and A nthrax (B. anthracis) Diagnostic Testing 
Anthrax Threats (Letters, packages, etc.)
D ealing  w ith  a su sp ic io u s package
• Do not open the letter.
• If the letter has already been opened and powder spills out, do not clean it up. Keep others away from  the area.
• Double bag the letter; plastic is best (use plastic/rubber gloves and a particulate mask if available).
• Immediately wash your hands with soap and water.
• Notify your supervisor, law enforcement officials, and the FBI
• Notify local, county, and state health officials
• Evacuate the area
• Ensure that all persons who have handled the letter wash their hands
• Start a list of names and telephone numbers all persons who have handled the letter
• Give potentially exposed persons information about the signs and symptoms of illness associated with the biologic agent and
about whom to contact and where to go should they develop illness.
• Place all clothing items worn when in contact with the letter into plastic bags
•Keep these bags with you, so that they are available for law enforcement officials
• As soon as possible shower with soap and water
A sym ptom atic p a tien t WITHOUT know n exp osu re
• Provide reassurance to the patient about the rarity of infection without known exposure.
• Recommend the patient see a health care provider for further concerns and/or diagnostic tests.
• It's important for people to know that there is no screening test available for the detection of anthrax 
infection in an asymptomatic person. Nasopharyngeal swabs and blood serum tests should not be used for 
diagnosis or screening. NP swabs and blood serum tests are generally used to confirm a case or as an 
epidemiologic tool.
A sym ptom atic p a tien t WITH know n exp osu re
• Conduct an individual risk assessment with public health officials and refer to a health care provider if 
post-exposure prophylaxis is necessary. Currently, there are no screening tests available for the detection 
of anthrax infection in an asymptomatic person.
• In this circumstance, decontaminating the patient and their clothing is not routinely recommended.
• In Florida, susceptibility testing determined that the isolate was penicillin susceptible, and therefore 
amoxicillin was indicated as a first-line agent.
• Post-exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) Recommendations
In it ia l the rapy D u ra tion
A d u lts  ( in c lud ing  p regnan t 
w om an  1,2 and 
im m m unocom prom ised)
Ciprofloxacin 500 mg po BID 
Or
Doxycycline 100 mg po BID
60 days
C h ild ren  1,3 Ciprofloxacin 15-20 mg/kg po Q12 hrs 4 
Or
Doxycycline 5:
>8 yrs and >45 kg: 100 mg po BID 
>8 yrs and < 45 kg: 2.2 mg/kg po BID
60 days
< 8 yrs: same as >8 yrs and < 45 kg
1. If susceptibility testing allows, therapy should be changed to oral amoxicillin for post-exposure
prophylaxis to continue therapy out to 60 days.
2. Although tetracyclines are not recommended during pregnancy, their use may be indicated for life-
threatening illness. Adverse affects on developing teeth and bones are dose related, therefore, 
doxycycline might be used for a short course of therapy (7-14 days) prior to the 6th month of 
gestation. Please consult physician after the 6th month of gestation for recommendations.
3. Use of tetracyclines and fluoroquinolones in children has adverse effects. These risks must be weighed
carefully against the risk for developing life-threatening disease. If a release of B. anthracis is 
confirmed, children should be treated initially with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline as prophylaxis but 
therapy should be changed to oral amoxicillin 40 mg/kg of body mass per day divided every 8 hours 
(not to exceed 500 mg three times daily) as soon as penicillin susceptibility of the organism has been 
confirmed.
4. Ciprofloxacin dose should not exceed 1 gram/day in children.
5. In 1991, the American Academy of Pediatrics amended their recommendation to allow treatment of
young children with tetracyclines for serious infections, such as, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, for 
which doxycycline may be indicated. Doxycycline is preferred for its twice-a-day dosing and low 
incidence of gastrointestinal side effects.
H o sp ita lized  P atien ts w ith  Sym ptom s C om patible w ith  A nthrax
• Notify local and state public health officials so they can begin an epidemiologic investigation.
• Confirm the diagnosis by obtaining the appropriate laboratory specimens based on the clinical form of 
anthrax that is suspected (inhalational, gastrointestinal, or cutaneous).
- In halational anthrax: n asa l sw ab, b lood , CSF, a n d /o r  sputum
- Gastrointestinal anthrax: vomitus, feces, and/or blood
- Cutaneous anthrax: vesicular fluid and/or blood
Evaluation of possible anthrax infection for individuals not connected with the AMI incident in Florida should be performed through 
standard laboratory tests, following the Laboratory Response Network (LRN [1]) guidelines http://www.bt.cdc.gov (follow the link for 
Resources: Agents/Diseases □ Bacillus anthracis)
Laboratory criteria for confirmation of B. anthracis infection: rapid screening assay (PCR-based and antigen detection based) for use on 
cultures and directly on clinical specimens
a. P resum ptive id en tifica tio n  cr iter ia  (lev e l A LRN 
laboratory)
1. From clinical samples, such as blood, CSF, or skin lesion (eschar) material: encapsulated gram-positive rods
2. From growth on sheep blood agar: large gram-positive rods
3. Nonmotile
4. Nonhemolytic on sheep blood agar
b. Confirmatory criteria for identification of B. anthracis (level B or C LRN laboratory)
1. Capsule production and
2. Lysis by gamma-phage or
3. Direct fluorescent antibody assay (DFA)
Signs and Symptoms of Anthrax Infection
Inhalational anthrax: A brief prodrome resembling a viral respiratory illness followed by development of hypoxia and dyspnea, with 
radiographic evidence of mediastinal widening. This, the most lethal, form of anthrax results from inspiration of 8,000-40,000 spores of B. 
anthracis. The incubation of inhalational anthrax among humans is unclear, but it is reported to range between 1 and 7 days possibly 
ranging up to 42 days. Host factors, dose of exposure and chemoprophylaxis may play a role. Initial symptoms include sore throat, mild 
fever, muscle aches and malaise. These may progress to respiratory failure and shock. Meningitis frequently develops. Case-fatality 
estimates for inhalational anthrax are based on incomplete information regarding exposed populations and infected populations in the few 
case series and studies that have been published. However, case-fatality is extremely high, even with all possible supportive care including 
appropriate antibiotics. Records of industrially acquired inhalational anthrax in the United Kingdom before antibiotics were available 
reveal that 97% of cases were fatal. With antibiotic treatment the fatality rate is estimated to be at least 75%. Though estimates of the 
impact of the delay in postexposure prophylaxis or treatment on survival can only be approximated, it has been suggested that or each day 
of delay postexposure in initiating prophylaxis the case-fatality rate increases by 5 to 10%.
Gastrointestinal anthrax: Severe abdominal distress followed by fever and signs of septicemia. This form of anthrax usually follows the 
consumption of raw or undercooked contaminated meat and is considered to have an incubation period of 1-7 days. An oropharyngeal and 
an abdominal form of the disease have been described in this category. Involvement of the pharynx is usually characterized by lesions at 
the base of the tongue, sore throat, dysphagia, fever, and regional lymphadenopathy. Lower bowel inflammation usually causes nausea, loss 
of appetite, vomiting and fever, followed by abdominal pain, vomiting blood and bloody diarrhea. The case-fatality is estimated to be 25­
60%, and the effect of early antibiotic treatment on that case-fatality is not defined.
Cutaneous anthrax: A skin lesion evolving from a papule, through a vesicular stage, to a depressed black eschar. This is the most common 
naturally occurring type of infection (>95%) and usually occurs after skin contact with contaminated meat, wool, hides or leather from 
infected animals. Incubation period ranges from 1-12 days. Skin infection begins as a small papule, progresses to a vesicle in 1-2 days 
followed by a necrotic ulcer. The lesion is usually painless, but patients also may have fever, malaise, headache and regional 
lymphadenopathy. The case fatality for cutaneous anthrax is 20% without and 1% with antibiotic treatment.
II. A nthrax In form ation  for  L aboratory P erson n el
These guidelines provide background information and guidance to clinical laboratory personnel in recognizing 
Bacillus anthracis in a clinical specimen. They are NOT intended to provide training for laboratory identification of 
B. anthracis. Clinical lab personnel will most likely be the first ones to perform preliminary testing on clinical 
specimens from patients who may have been intentionally exposed to the organism, and will play a critical role in 
facilitating rapid identification of B. anthracis. Laboratory confirmation of B. anthracis should be performed at the 
State Public Health Laboratory.
Any suspected isolate of B. anthracis must be reported to the State Public Health Laboratory IMMEDIATELY. The State Public 
Health Laboratory is available for consultation or testing 24 hours per day and can be reached through the DOH, Communicable 
Disease Epidemiology 24-hour emergency number.
HANDLING LABORATORY SPECIMENS (p o ss ib le  B. anthracis)
• Risk to lab personnel from handling clinical lab specimens with B. anthracis is low, but it is important to minimize possible exposures to
personnel as well as prevent contamination of the lab. Standard lab practices are sufficient. If B. anthracis is suspected, these 
precautions should be followed:
- Wear gloves and protective gowns when handling clinical specimens
- Wash immediately with soap and water if there is direct contact with a clinical or lab specimen
- Avoid splashing or creating aerosols
- Perform lab tests in an annually certified Class II Biological Safety Cabinet; if that is not possible, then use standard lab protective
eyewear and a mask
- Blood cultures should be maintained in a closed system (blood culture bottles)
- Keep culture plates covered at all times; minimize exposure when extracting specimens for testing
- Work on a smooth surface that can be cleaned easily and wipe with bleach regularly.
• If  lab or clinical specimen material is spilled or splashed onto lab personnel:
- Remove outer clothing carefully while still in the lab and place in a labeled, plastic bag
- Remove rest of clothing in the locker room and place in a labeled, plastic bag
- Shower thoroughly with soap and water in the locker room
- Inform your supervisor and physician
• If  exposure to contaminated sharps occurs:
- Follow standard reporting procedures for sharps exposures
- Thoroughly irrigate site with soap and water and apply a disinfectant solution such as a 0.5% hypochlorite solution. DO NOT
SCRUB AREA.
- Promptly begin prophylaxis for cutaneous anthrax
- Recommended treatment for cutaneous exposure: prophylaxis with Ciprofloxacin 500 mg by mouth twice a day for 7-10 days or
Doxycycline 100 mg by mouth twice a day for 7-10 days.
- Notify the State Department of Health (DOH), Public Health Laboratory (PHL)
ROLE OF TH E  CLIN ICAL LABO RATO RY
• Perform laboratory tests for presumptive identification of B. anthracis on clinical specimens
• Raise your index of suspicion for B. anthracis when the clinical picture (provided by the clinician) involves a rapidly progressive
respiratory illness of unknown cause in a previously healthy person
• Refer any suspected isolates IMMEDIATELY to the DOH, PHL
PRESUMPTIVE IDENTIFCATION OF Bacillus anthracis
• D irect sm ears from  c lin ica l spec im ens
- Encapsulated broad rods in short chains, 2-4 cells. India Ink will demonstrate capsule (Gram stain
will not)
- B. anthracis will not usually be present in clinical specimens until late in course of the disease
• Sm ears from  sheep  b lo od  agar or o the r rou tine  nu tr ien t m edium
- Non-encapsulated broad rods in long chains
- Encapsulated bacilli will only grow in nutrient agar supplemented with 0.8% sodium bicarbonate in the presence of 5% CO2
(Note: this procedure is performed in Level B laboratories)
Gram stain morphology of B. anthracis
• Broad, gram-positive rod: 1-1.5 x 3-5 ^
• Oval, central to subterminal spores: 1 x 1.5  ^with no significant swelling of cell
• Spores usually NOT present in clinical specimens unless exposed to atmospheric O2
C olonial C haracteristics o f  B. anthracis
• Bacillus anthraciscan be isolated primarily from blood, sputum, CSF, vesicular fluid or eschar, and stool (if 
gastrointestinal anthrax).
• After incubation on a blood agar plate for 15-24 hours at 35-37° C, well isolated colonies are 2-5 mm in 
diameter; heavily inoculated areas may show growth in 6-8 hours
• Gray-white, flat or slightly convex colonies are irregularly round, with edges that slightly undulate, and 
have ground glass appearance
• Often have comma-shaped protrusions from colony edge (Medusa head colonies)
• Tenacious consistency (when teased with a loop, the growth will stand up like a beaten egg white)
• Non-hemolytic (weak hemolysis may be observed under areas of confluent growth in aging cultures and
should NOT be confused with real p-hemolysis)
• Will not grow on MacConkey agar
• Non-motile
Presumptive Identification key for Bacillus anthracis
• Non-hemolytic
• Non-motile
• Encapsulated (requires India ink to visualize the capsule)
• Gram-positive, sporeforming rod
If B. anthracis is suspected
• The health care provider, local law enforcement, and the local and State DOH should be notified 
immediately
• Do not perform further tests once you have reason to suspect B. anthracis. The specimen should be 
transported to the DOH as directed (see Packaging and Transporting Protocol)
• Level B laboratories (State DOH) will perform the following presumptive and confirmatory tests:
-lysis by gamma phage
-capsule detection (by DFA)
-detection of cell-wall polysaccharide antigen by DFA
DECONTAMINATION
• Effective sporicidal decontamination solutions
• Commercially-available bleach, 0.5% hypochlorite (a 1:10 dilution of household bleach)
• Rinse off the concentrated bleach to avoid its caustic effects
Surfaces and n o n -ster iliza b le  equ ip m en t
• Work surfaces should be wiped before and after use with a sporicidal decontamination solution
• Routinely clean non-sterilizable equipment with a decontamination solution
Contaminated instruments (pipettes, needles, loops, micro slides)
• Soak in a decontamination solution until autoclaving
A ccidental sp ills  o f  m ateria l know n or su sp ected  to  be  
con tam in ated  w ith  B. anthracis
• For contamination involving fresh clinical samples:
• Flood with a decontamination solution
• Soak five minutes before cleaning up
• For contamination involving lab samples, such as culture plates or blood cultures, or spills occurring in
areas that are below room temperature:
• Gently cover spill, then liberally apply decontamination solution
• Soak for one hour before cleaning up
• Any materials soiled during the clean-up must be autoclaved or incinerated
DISPOSAL
• Incinerate or steam sterilize cultures, infected material, and suspect material
PACKAGING and TRANSPORTING PROTOCOL 
Packaging and la b e lin g  sp ec im en s is th e  sam e as for any  
in fec tio u s su b stan ce
• If the specimen is a dry powder or paper material, place it in a plastic zip-lock bag, and place biohazard 
label (see diagram)
• If the specimen is a clinical specimen, place biohazard label on the specimen receptacle, wrap the 
receptacle with an absorbent material (see diagram)
• Place the bag or specimen receptacle into a leak proof container with a tight cover that is labeled 
biohazard.
• Place this container into a second leak proof container with a tight cover that is labeled biohazard. The 
size of the second container should be no larger than a one-gallon paint can.
• For a clinical specimen, an ice pack (not ice) should be placed in the second container to keep the 
specimen cold
• If the specimen is not a clinical specimen, but is paper or powder, the ice pack should be omitted
• Place the second container into a third leak proof container with a tight cover that is labeled biohazard. 
The third container should be no larger than a five-gallon paint can.
• Both containers should meet state and federal regulations for transport of hazardous material, and be
properly labeled.
T ransporting sp ecim en s to  th e DOH Public H ealth  Lab
• Will be coordinated with the DOH Public Health Lab at [state telephone number]
• Local FBI personnel may be utilized to transport specimens if bioterrorism is suspected
• In cases where the specimen is shipped by commercial carrier, ship according to State and Federal 
shipping regulations
Helpful Websites
• Biosafety in the Microbiology Lab www.cdc.gov/od/ohs
• Guideline for Isolation Precautions www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip
• Public Health Image Library phil.cdc.gov
• CDC Division of Laboratory Systems (DLS) www.phppo.cdc.gov/dls/default.asp




• Laboratory Protocols for bioterrorism response laboratories for the identification of Bacillus anthracis. CDC 
BT public web site: www.bt.cdc.gov
• Inglesby TV, Henderson DA, Barlett JG, Ascher MS, et al. Anthrax as a biological weapon: Medical and 
public health management (consensus statement). JAMA, May 12, 1999;281(18):1735-1745.
• No authors listed. Biological warfare and terrorism: the military and public health response. U.S. Army, 
Public Health Training Network, Centers for Disease Control, Food and Drug Administration, Satellite 
broadcast, September 21-23, 1999.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) protects people's health and safety by preventing and
controlling diseases and injuries; enhances health decisions by providing credible information on critical health 
issues; and promotes healthy living through strong partnerships with local, national and international
organizations.
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